Abstract: Decision making in the United States Courts of Appeals occurs primarily in three-judge panels with rotating membership. A substantial proportion of court of appeals cases is decided by panels that include a judge who is not a regular court of appeals jurist but is, instead, a district court judge serving temporarily on the court of appeals bench. Taken together, these two traits mean that court of appeals decision making is often a function of small groups with temporary members. In this paper, we set out to examine whether designated district court judges behave differently than their court of appeals colleagues with whom they render decisions. And, in doing so, we suggest a profitable direction for theory building vis-à-vis judicial behavior. Our analysis of data contained in the United States Courts of Appeals Database indicates that the votes of judges on three-judge panels are influenced by the preferences of their fellow panelists and that variance in the ideological direction of votes cast is not systematically related to status as a designated district court judge, with such judges manifesting greater variance in their ideological decision making.
I.

Introduction
The identity of a decision maker affects the decisions that are made. Scholars have amassed considerable evidence in support of this contention, whether the focus is on political elites or ordinary voters (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Huckfeldt 1979; Mansbridge 1999) . But decision makers do not act in a vacuum and scholars cognizant of this fact have directed our attention to the confluence of individual identities and group contexts that jointly result in political decisions (Caldeira, Clark, and Patterson 1993; Caldeira and Patterson 1987; Hare, Borgatta, and Bales 1965; Verba 1961) . They argue, in short, that decisions are a function of both who decision makers are and with whom decision makers make their decisions. Law and courts scholars focused on strategic behavior explicitly recognize this sort of interdependence in conceptualizing the decision calculi of judges on collegial courts.
1 Left largely unexplored, however, are the less strategic and more psychological aspects of the interaction of identities and context for appellate judges rendering collective decisions (Martinek 2006 ; but see Danelski 1989; Murphy 1966; Ulmer 1971; Walker 1973a Walker , 1973b Wrightsman 1999 Wrightsman , 2006 . In particular, members of collegial courts differ in the roles they play (both formally and informally defined) and those roles may have meaningful behavioral manifestations that are conditioned by the small group of which they are members.
Two particular features of decision making on the United States Courts of Appeals provide a unique opportunity to examine how the identities of judges and the small group context within which they operate can jointly shape behavior. First, the United States Courts of Appeals process the vast majority of their workload with the use of rotating three-judge panels (Cohen 2002, 72; Howard 1981, 188-192; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 2000, 8) . The chief judge of each circuit is responsible for constructing both the three-judge panels and the calendar of cases, though in practice the chief judge delegates these tasks to the court's administrative staff (Brown and Lee 2000; Feinberg 1984) . The composition of each panel is generally random 2 and, with rare exception, the assignment of cases to particular panels is likewise random. 3 Hence, court of appeals judges make most of their decisions in temporary small groups.
Second, a substantial proportion of court of appeals cases is decided by panels that include a judge who is not a regular court of appeals jurist but is, instead, a district court judge serving temporarily on the court of appeals bench. These district court judges, who are said to be serving by designation, occupy a unique position on three-judge circuit court panels. They are formally fungible with the regularly sitting court of appeals judges on the panel (Green and Atkins 1978) . They enjoy formal decision-making equality with their fellow panel members, can and do author panel decisions, and possess the same prerogatives as the regularly sitting court of appeals judges with regard to the decision to concur or dissent. But, district court judges serving by designation remain district court judges, judges who, though familiar with federal law, normally serve in a very different capacity as a trial court judge than they do when called to (temporarily) serve as an appellate court judge. 4 This has led a number of legal commentators to argue that, in fact, designated district court judges are not fully fungible with their court of appeals brethren (e.g., Brudney and Ditslear 2001; Saphire and Solimine 1995) .
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Our immediate purpose in this paper is two-fold. First, we seek to exploit the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database to contribute new evidence with regard to the behavior of district court judges serving by designation, thereby helping to inform the continuing policy debate over their usage. Second, we attempt to advance our theoretical understanding of judicial decision making by applying a small group 2 Though random assignment is not a function of statutory command, random assignment is the generally accepted norm and, indeed, is necessitated by circuit rules in some courts of appeals (Brown and Lee 2000; Solimine 1988 ). There is evidence to suggest, however, that random assignment has not always been the norm (Atkins and Zavoina 1974) . And, charges of "panel stacking," such as in the case of the panel assigned to hear the recent Michigan University affirmative action cases, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, continue to surface on occasion . 3 The most notable exception is for cases that are closely related in substantive terms; e.g., cases that deal with the exact same issue of law. Such cases "may be assigned to the same panel in an effort to avoid unneeded repetition of effort and to avoid potential intracircuit conflicts" (Cohen 2002, 72) . Cohen further notes that case assignments may be influenced by the desire to maximize equitable distribution of caseload, with attention paid to systematic differences in how time-consuming different kinds of cases are (2002, 72) . 4 As Carrington succinctly asserts, "The use of district judges does present a special problem with respect to its impact on the quality of review, since the qualities that make a good trial judge are somewhat different from those which make a good appellate judge" (1969, 565) . 5 Both courts of appeals and district court judges themselves recognize important differences in the roles they play and the skills needed to fulfill their respective roles (Cohen 2002, 192-199; Howard 1981, 134-138 
II. United States District Court Judges in the United States Courts of Appeals
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1988), the chief judge of a circuit has the authority to designate a district court judge to serve in a temporary capacity as a court of appeals judge. 6 This practice preceded statutory codification and has been a fact of judicial life in the courts of appeals from the time these courts were created under the Evarts Act of 1891 (Saphire and Solimine 1995, 360 (Note 1963, 878; Saphire and Solimine 1995, 361-362; Wasby 1980-81, 378 )-the primary motivation for the circuits' reliance on designated district court judges is to facilitate the processing of the burgeoning workload faced by the courts of appeals (Green and Atkins 1978, 359-360; Saphire and Solimine1995, 362-363) . 9 The challenges to prompt adjudication facing the United States Courts of 6 Under this statutory authority, chief judges can also seek the assistance of district court judges from other circuits but they can so serve only with the approval of the Chief Justice of the United States. A court of appeals judge from another circuit may also be "designated" to temporarily serve on a circuit other than his own home circuit but this is quite rare and, as with district court judges from outside of the circuit, such designation requires the approval of the Chief Justice of the United States. 7 This includes service provided by active duty and retired district court judges. Most of these district court judges were active duty. 8 Each judge participating in a case yields one case participation. Hence, a three-judge panel yields three case participations. Each en banc proceeding yields one case participation for each court of appeals judge in the circuit (assuming each participates in the en banc proceeding) or, in the case of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, one case participation for each of the 15 judges who participates in the minien banc proceeding used in that circuit. 9 In his account of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit under Chief Judge Learned Hand, Schick (1970) The use of designated district court judges has been the subject of severe criticism. Some judges have suggested that, rather than ameliorate workload pressures, designated district court judges might actually exacerbate the workload facing court of appeals judges. They have the potential to do so because the regular court of appeals judges might feel compelled "to retain the important cases because they perceive that it would weaken the authority of an important rule if it were written by a visiting judge" (Cohen 2002, 196) . Further, their lack of familiarity with circuit procedures may require visiting district court judges to impose on their panel colleagues for consultation and guidance (Cohen 2002, 197; Wasby 1980 Wasby -1981 . Finally, designated district court judges continue to have district court work of their own that requires their time and attention, forcing them to juggle the demands of both their district court and circuit court workloads (2002, 197) .
Several legal scholars have also expressed reservations about the use of designated district court judges because they see the practice as having the potential to compromise the legitimacy of court of appeals decisions in the eyes of litigants, attorneys, and judges as well as the larger legal and political community (Alexander 1965; Note 1963, 879) . Interviews of circuit judges in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit conducted by Wasby (1980 Wasby ( -1981 in the late 1970s and more recently by Cohen (2002, 191-201) indicate that at least some of these judges do, in fact, worry that this practice will devalue the legitimacy of the courts of appeals. Appellate courts use groups of judges, which "permits the collective decision-making essential to appellate adjudication without engendering excessive duplication of judicial effort" (Note 1963, 877-878) .
The operative principle is that appellate review requires the collective deliberation of more than one judge to avoid (or at least minimize) appellate error by either failing to correct a wayward trial court judge or, alternatively, reversing a trial court judge who was correct in his judgment (Drahozal 1998) . To the extent that designated district court judges are deferential to the regular sitting, active duty court of appeals judges with whom they are deciding cases, that ideal of appellate deliberation is compromised:
District judges who serve for only short periods may view themselves and may be viewed as subordinate to their appellate counterparts. It may be difficult to set aside, even temporarily, the necessarily hierarchical nature of the relationship between the permanent and temporary judges. If so, the district judge may be deferential to his circuit counterparts and reluctant to vote differently in the form of concurring or dissenting opinions. Perhaps mindful that his own decisions are reviewed periodically, the district judge may be hesitant to depart from the vote of the two permanent circuit panel members (Saphire and Solimine 1995, 376) . Further, to achieve the social benefit of correcting error in the sense of deviations from "socially desirable decisions" (Shavell 2006, 2) 11 appellate courts seek to promote stability and consistency in the law. Such consistency is requisite for citizens to effectively conform their behavior to the requirements of the established legal order. Consistency is also necessary for attorneys: "Uncertainty in doctrine, while undoubtedly of interest to academics and theoreticians, is an anathema to the practitioner whose sound counsel is dependent upon the stability that doctrinal stability affords" (Sullivan 2002, 810; see, also, Carrington 1969 ).
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District court judges serving by designation, however, have the potential to undermine consistency in the law: "Because a visitor [including a district court judge sitting by designation] is not a regular member of the court and does not sit on en banc proceedings, he introduces an element of instability on the panel on which he serves" (Carrington 1969, 565) . A similar sentiment was voiced by one of the court of appeals judges interviewed by Cohen: "A district judge is supposed to make them [i.e., decisions] individually, and a court of appeals is supposed to make them collectively. That facilitates stability in the law, moderation, and predictability" (2002, 192) . In sum, district court judges sitting by designation may threaten consistency in the law because they are temporary members, temporary members with different mindset who may be either less committed to consistency in circuit law or less equipped by virtue of experience to contribute to consistency in circuit law (Cohen 2002, 198) .
There are, then, very real concerns about how the use of designated district court judges may affect the quality of the appellate process. The answer to the question of whether such judges manifest behavioral differences when compared to the regular sitting court of appeals judges has meaningful policy consequences and, for that reason alone, the question merits investigation. But, an examination of the behavior of designated district court judges can also contribute to theory building vis-à-vis judicial behavior.
III. Designated District Court Judges and Theory Building
For quite some time the preeminent theory of judicial decision making has been the attitudinal model Spaeth 1993, 2002) . In essence, the attitudinal model asserts that the votes of judges are the product of their ideological preferences: liberal judges vote liberally while conservative judges vote conservatively. To date, the most impressive evidence in support of the attitudinal model has been amassed by Spaeth (1993, 2002) for justices occupying the United States Supreme Court bench. But there is also a substantial body of research demonstrating the utility of the attitudinal model for 12 The importance of consistency is reflected in the commitment of common law legal systems to the principle of stare decisis, the principle that like cases should be treated alike. Some legal scholars, however, urge a less rigid adherence to legal consistency as represented by stare decisis (Coons 1987; Peters 1996) .
understanding decision making on the United States Courts of Appeals (e.g., Goldman 1966 Goldman , 1975 Songer and Haire 1992) and the United States District Courts Carp 1980, 1983; Ringquist and Emmert 1999 ; but see Rowland and Carp 1996) as well as state courts of last resort (e.g., Brace and Hall 1997; Hall and Brace 1996) . There is also a small body of scholarship that supports the idea that the attitudinal model travels beyond the American context (e.g., Ostberg and Wetstein 2004) .
Though reference to judicial attitudes and their influence is now de rigeur in the majority of current scholarship devoted to judicial decision making, several prominent scholars in the law and courts community see the emerging (emergent?) hegemon as the strategic model (e.g., Epstein and Knight 2000) . 13 While both the attitudinal and the strategic model start from the assumption that judges are policy-minded actors, the strategic model considers judges as forward-thinking individuals who take into account the interdependent nature of their decisions. The evidence in support of a strategic theory of judicial behavior is ubiquitous. With regard to the U.S. Supreme Court, perhaps the most compelling case in favor of the utility of the strategic model has been made in a recent series of articles and a book authored by Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck (2000; Maltzman 1998, 1999) . 14 The evidence regarding the strategic nature of decision making by state court of last resort judges is likewise abundant Hall 1990, 1995; Brace 1992, 1999; Langer 2002 Epstein and Knight (2000) go so far as to characterize what they see as the shift toward strategic approaches in the study of judicial behavior as a "sea change" that is leading to a veritable revolution in the field. Hall and Brace (1999) are more guarded in their evaluation, though they, too, see the development of strategic approaches as beneficial and are cautiously optimistic about its advancement. 14 Other notable works include Boucher and Segal (1995) , Brenner (1982) , Brenner and Krol (1989) , Epstein and Knight (1998) , Gely and Spiller (1990) , Hammond, Bonneau, and Sheehan (2005) . Of course, all of the contemporary work owes a significant intellectual debt to Murphy's puissant book,
Elements of Judicial Strategy (1964).
Appeals given their tremendous workloads; that is, given the fact that court of appeals jurists do not have the necessary time to engage in strategic calculations in any but the most limited of circumstances.
Further, the strategic model is narrow in its sole focus on securing preferred policy outcomes. It ignoresas does the attitudinal model-the fact that judges care about and are influenced by their working environments and the colleagues with whom they work as well as the policy ends they seek to achieve.
Of course courts of appeals judges care about policy outcomes. That is much too well established a fact to be gainsaid. But, court of appeals judges, who almost always dispose of cases in multi-judge panels, are cognizant of the identities and roles of the other judges with whom they work. Further, those identities and roles can and do matter for behavior within that group, a proposition that is supported by a small but informative body of research.
Early work by Atkins (1973) , Ulmer (1971) , and Walker (1973a Walker ( , 1973b , among others, all profitably viewed decision making through the prism of small group theory. Common to this body of scholarship is the idea that the status of group members matters for their behavior. Some members of collegial courts are better able, by virtue of formal authority or dint of personality, to exercise leadership (e.g., Ulmer 1971) . In addition, those with higher levels of status may be advantaged in terms of securing support from other members of the collegial body of which they are members (Walker 1973b) .
Conversely, those with lower status (e.g., lower state court judges serving on the Washington State Supreme Court) may be deferential vis-à-vis the permanent members of the bench (e.g., regular supreme court justices) (Walker 1973a ).
District court judges serving by designation are, by definition, temporary members of the small group constituted by the three-judge panel on the courts of appeals. And, as noted previously, there is reason to assume that they may see themselves (and be seen by others) as possessing a different (lower) status than the regularly sitting, active duty judges with whom they are rendering decisions. They, then, afford us an opportunity to evaluate whether and how a particular small group member-the designated district court judge-is influenced by his particular status in the group as well as his fellow panel members.
In particular, we, first, consider the extent to which the decision making of designated district court judges is influenced by their panel colleagues. Recall that some legal observers (e.g., Saphire and We also assess the consistency of the voting behavior of district court judges serving by designation. As discussed previously, some students of the courts (e.g., Carrington 1969)-and even some judges (see, e.g., Cohen 2002)-have suggested that designated district court judges will introduce uncertainty in the law because of the temporary nature of their service. Considering the variance in ideological voting of designated district court judges is one means of evaluating the extent to which they are more variable in their voting behavior. Accordingly, we hypothesize as follows: designated district court judges will be positively associated with variance in ideological voting.
The empirical evidence we bring to bear below on these hypotheses will be informative both with regard to the utility of a small group perspective for understanding decision making on the United States
Courts of Appeals and the debate over whether designated district court judges behave in meaningfully different ways from regular court of appeals judges.
IV. Data and Methodology
To subject the two primary hypotheses articulated above to empirical testing, we utilize data from 1970 to 1996 available from the U.S. Court of Appeals Database (Songer 1999) . Because our hypotheses are at the individual level, we transformed Songer's database such that the judge-vote is the unit of analysis, rather than the case, using a modification of the code developed by Collins (2006 
The primary distinction between the more familiar homoskedastic probit model and the heteroskedastic probit model is the inclusion of the variance model in the denominator of the heteroskedastic model (Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 1062) . As such, the unrestricted (i.e., the heteroskedastic) model produces two categories of estimates: those related to the causes of liberal or conservative voting (i.e., involving the mean of the distribution of the dependent variable) and those related to the causes of consistent or inconsistent voting (i.e., involving the variance of the distribution of the dependent variable). If the error variance is constant, the model reduces to the standard, homoskedastic probit model. If, as we hypothesize, the error variance in a judge's voting behavior is non-constant, we can reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity and conclude that the model is systematically heteroskedastic. To control for the non-independence of observations-in that judges appear more than once in the data-we estimate the model using robust standard errors, clustered on judge (see, e.g., King 1998, 34) . Further, we employ the weights reported in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database to account for its sampling composition.
To measure each judge's Ideology, we use the scores created by Peppers (2001, 2002) . Based on Poole's (1998) first dimension common space scores, this variable captures the is predicated on the fact that en bancs have unique dynamics (George 1999 ) and designated district court judges do not participate in them. dynamics of the appointment process-for both designated district court and court of appeals judges-by considering the preference of each judge's appointing president and home state senators. If senatorial courtesy is absent (i.e., the home state senators do not share the same party affiliation as the president), this variable takes on the president's common space score. If one senator from the home state delegation shares the president's party affiliation, this variable takes on that senator's ideal point score. If both of the home state senators share the party affiliation of the president, this variable takes on the mean value of the two senator's scores. To facilitate interpretation, we have rescaled this variable by adding 0.784 to each score and then multiplying the scores by 10. This variable ranges from 0 to 14.4, with higher scores reflecting more conservative ideologies. Accordingly, we expect that this variable will be negatively signed, indicating that judges with conservative ideologies are less likely to cast liberal votes than liberal judges.
To evaluate interpersonal influence on three-judge panels, we include a measure of Ideological Influence. For each judge serving on a panel, this variable takes on the mean Ideology score of the other two judges. We expect that this variable will be negatively signed, indicating that, the more conservative the other panelists with whom a judge is making a decision, the less likely that judge is to case a liberal vote. To investigate if district court judges are especially susceptible to this form of influence (as some critics have argued, thereby suggesting that they are not co-equal in panel deliberations), we include a District Court Judge variable in the model, scored 0 for court of appeals judges and 1 for district court judges serving on the panels by designation. We then interact this variable with our measure of Ideological Influence to determine if district court judges are distinctively influenced by their appeals court counterparts. Since we cannot infer from the sign or statistical significance of this interaction term whether district court judges are different from appeals court judges (Ai and Norton 2003) , it is necessary to calculate the marginal effect and confidence intervals for this interaction term, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values. To do this, we adapt the method created by Brambor, Clark, and Golder To take litigant resources into account, we include a variable in the model that captures the resource differential between the liberal and conservative litigant. Following Songer, Sheehan, and Haire (1999, 824) , we create a status continuum of parties by ranking litigants according to increasing resource as follows: individuals = 1, businesses = 2, state governments = 3, and the federal government = 4. To compute our measure of Litigant Resources we simply subtract the conservative litigant's resource score from the liberal litigant's score. Accordingly, we expect that this variable will be positively signed, indicating that a judge is more likely to support the liberal litigant if that litigant ranks higher on the resource continuum than the conservative litigant.
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Since the courts of appeals sit below the Supreme Court in the federal judicial hierarchy, it is likewise important to control for the preferences of the Supreme Court to capture the extent to which court of appeals judges follow the ideological proclivities of their supervisory court (e.g., Benesh 2002; Haire, Lindquist, and Songer 2003; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994) . To do this, we include a Supreme Court Ideology variable, adopted from Epstein, Martin, Segal, and Westerland (n.d.) , who provide ideological surrogates for the Supreme Court on the identical metric we utilize to capture the ideologies of designated district court judges and court of appeals judges. These scores are a transformation of Martin and Quinn's (2002) ideal point estimates for the median member of the Supreme Court, mapped onto the same dimension as the Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (2002) scores. To facilitate interpretation, we have rescaled these scores by adding 0.103 to each ideal point and multiplying them by 10. This variable ranges from 0 to 2.89, with higher scores reflecting more conservative Supreme Courts. As such, we expect this variable will be negatively signed, indicating that, as the median justice on the Supreme Court becomes more conservative, so too will the decision making patterns of court of appeals judges (i.e., they will be less likely to vote liberally).
We also control for the issue area implicated in the case. First, judges are less likely to cast liberal votes in criminal cases because such cases are overwhelmingly legally inconsequential but must be heard due to the mandatory docket of the United States Courts of Appeals (Martinek 2006, 811) .
Despite their tremendous importance to the individual litigants involved, they simply do not raise important 16 As an alternative to this measure, we also employed a proxy for the perceived resources of the litigant's attorneys, scored such that 1 = pro se counsel, 2 = court appointed counsel or public defender, 3 = private counsel, 4 = interest group counsel, 5 = state or local government counsel, and 6 = federal government counsel. That variable correlates with our litigant resources variable at 0.87, thus making the inclusion of both variables in the model inappropriate. When we use the counsel resources variable in place of the litigant resources variable, the results do not substantively differ. legal issues and are less likely to garner judicial support (see, e.g., Howard 1981, 174-175; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 2000, 114-115) . Accordingly, because votes in favor of the criminally accused or convicted are defined as liberal, our expectation is that judges will vote conservatively in criminal cases.
Further, some types of cases systematically depress or enhance the effect of judicial ideology on vote choice. Habeas corpus and diversity of citizenship cases are less likely to map onto the conventional liberal-conservative ideological spectrum (Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 2000, 140) . Accordingly, we include a variable-Habeas/Diversity Case-that is coded 1 if the case implicates a habeas corpus petition or if the case involves diversity of citizenship, and zero otherwise, which is then interacted with the measure of judge ideology. We have no expectation with regard to the relationship between the Habeas/Diversity Case variable and the ideological direction of the judge's vote by itself but expect its interaction with ideology to be negatively signed. Conversely, cases that involve civil rights, the First Amendment, due process, and privacy are more likely to bring the ideological preferences of the judges into play. Hence, we include a variable-Civil Rights Case-that is scored 1 if the case involved any of those issues, and 0 otherwise. In this case, we have no expectation with regard to the relationship between the Civil Rights Case variable and the ideological direction of the judge's vote but expect its interaction with ideology to be positively signed.
Thus far, our focus has been on the choice of the judge to vote liberally or conservatively. In the choice model described above, we are primarily interested in whether district court judges serving by designation are any more or less influenced by the ideological preferences of their panel colleagues than regularly sitting, active duty court of appeals judges. Recall, however, that we are also interested in evaluating whether district court judges serving by designation are any more or less variable in their voting behavior than regularly sitting active duty court of appeals judges. To this end, we include four variables in the variance vector: District Court Judge, Civil Rights Case, Habeas/Diversity Case, and Criminal Case. In each case, the variable is operationalized in the same manner as for the choice model, as described above. The District Court Judge variable is the variable of substantive interest with regard to the hypothesis about the voting consistency of district court judges serving by designation. If the variance in voting is positively related to the fact that a given judge-vote is cast by a designed district court judge, then we have evidence of voting instability among such judges, which has implications for legal consistency. The three other variables in the variance model (Civil Rights Case, Habeas/Diversity Case, Criminal Case) are all expected to increase variance because of the variability in ideological content in each of these types of cases.
V. Results
[ Table 1 About Here] Table 1 reports the results from the heteroskedastic probit model that forecasts the probability of observing a judge cast a liberal vote. The model correctly predicts 66.5% of votes for a percent reduction in error of 13.7%. Importantly, note that the results reveal that systematic heteroskedasticity exists in the data (though, as discussed further below, that heteroskedasticity is not related to designated district court judges). Evidence of this is provided by the heteroskedasticity test that compares the unrestricted model to the homoskedastic model by way of the likelihood ratio test, where L 0 is the log likelihood for the homoskedastic probit model, L H is the log likelihood for the heteroskedastic probit model, and k is the number of estimated parameters in the variance portion of the model (Alvarez and Brehm 1995: 1063) .
The likelihood ratio is LR = 2 × (L H -L 0 ), which is distributed by χ 2 with k degrees of freedom. As this test statistic signifies, we can reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, indicating that the heteroskedastic probit model provides a better fit than the restricted model. 17 To facilitate interpretation, we discuss the marginal effects of each variable, which were calculated altering the variables of interest from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables and from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean for continuous variables, holding all other variables constant at their mean or modal values, as appropriate.
Turning first to the mean vector, the results provide strong-though not surprising-support for the role of ideology in shaping decision making on the courts of appeals. Recall that we interact the The results regarding the issue area controls are also of import. First, the model reveals that judges are significantly less likely to cast liberal votes in criminal rights cases. Compared to other issue areas, a judge is 23% more likely to vote conservatively in criminal cases, likely due to the tendency for many of these cases to involve relatively frivolous appeals. Figure 2 plots the judge's predicted voting behavior in civil rights (top of Figure 2 ) and habeas corpus/diversity cases (bottom of Figure 2) .
Considering, first, civil rights cases, this figure reveals that judges tend to vote about 10% more liberally in civil rights cases than in other issue areas. However, this difference is only significant for liberal, moderate, and moderately conservative judges. For judges with extremely conservative credentials, their decision making does not differ in civil rights cases. The results of the figure that plots the judges' decision making in habeas corpus and diversity of citizenship cases (i.e., the bottom of Figure 2 ) reveals almost identical results: in these cases, judges are about 14% more likely to cast liberal votes, and this finding holds regardless of a judge's ideological preferences.
Turning now the variables in the variance vector, two important findings emerge. First, district court judges are not more variable than their court of appeals counterparts. Thus, while district court judges are more liberal, and less susceptible to the influence of their fellow panelists, their decision making is neither more nor less consistent than that of the regularly sitting, active duty circuit court judges. Second, the results of the issue area controls reveal that judges' voting behavior is less consistent in criminal, civil rights, habeas corpus, and diversity of citizenship cases. This comports with the results in the mean model. That is, not only are judges more likely to modify their behavior in these types of cases, but these alterations systematically affect the extent to which we can anticipate consistent decision making. For example, the results regarding the Criminal Case variable reveal that judges are more conservative in these cases (choice model) and that this influences the error variance associated with their choices (variance model). That is, all judges-liberal, moderate, and conservative-are more conservative than we would normally expect in criminal cases.
VI. Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we set out to simultaneously examine an empirical question with important public policy implications and suggest a profitable direction for theory building vis-à-vis judicial behavior. They have raised concerns that such judges may, among other things, threaten the appellate process by being too deferential to the court of appeals judges with whom they work and compromise the consistency of the law due to their status as outsiders on the court. The evidence we offer in this paper, however, should offer some comfort to those concerned about the use of designated district court judges.
In terms of the influence of their fellow panelists on their own votes, designated district court judges are, if anything, less likely to be influenced by their colleagues. In terms of the consistency of their behavior, designated district court judges are no more or less likely to demonstrate inconsistency in their voting behavior than the court of appeals judges with whom they render decisions.
To be sure, ideological voting and variance in ideological voting are not the only phenomena of interest when it comes to the participation of district court judges. For example, researchers have established that permanent newcomers to the bench (i.e., new court of appeals judges) evidence a reluctance to file separate opinions (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2003) . The same may be true for designated judges, who are temporary newcomers to the bench. Brudney and Ditslear's (2001) analysis of cases involving National Labor Relations Act claims suggests, in fact, that this is true. Other scholars have demonstrated that "freshmen" on the United States Supreme Court are more likely to conform to precedent, an effect that tapers off as the justices' tenure in office progresses (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004) .
It is not unreasonable to suppose that the same may hold true of designated district court judges. Of special interest in this regard would be whether designated district court judges are equally attentive to both circuit law and Supreme Court precedent. Further, in addition to any behavioral differences between designated district court judges and regular circuit court judges, there may well be consequences for the legitimacy of the courts Saphire and Solimine 1995) .
The analysis that we have presented in this paper also speaks to the usefulness of taking a small group perspective to theory building in the study of judicial behavior. The key finding in this regard is not, as we had anticipated, a special sensitivity of designated district court judges to the preferences of their circuit judge colleagues on a panel. But, our finding that the ideology of fellow panelists matters for the decisions rendered by regular circuit court judges indicates that context (read: the small group context) matters. 
